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HOW OFFSHORE FINANCIAL COMPETITION DISCIPLINES EXIT
RESISTANCE BY INCENTIVE-CONFLICTED BANK REGULATORS
Financial contracts promise to move wealth across time and space.  Due to the
difficulty of neutralizing bad luck and counterparty conflicts of interest, the economic
value and enforceability of financial contracts are never certain.  Even though no one can
ever completely verify the accuracy or timeliness of information that purports to describe
either the condition of a financial institution or the creditworthiness of a borrower or
other counterparty, some parties are more informationally disadvantaged than others.
Recent financial crises in Latin America, Asia, and Russia underscore the extent to which
differences in information can intensify the valuation and performance risks that inhere
even in straightforward banking transactions.
Rational investors recognize the uncertainty of current information and future
events and try to manage its effects.  Asset-valuation theory assumes that at any time
investors translate whatever information they possess into an estimated probability
distribution of how future events are apt to affect the flow of net earnings allocable to
different financial contracts.  One application of this theory is to explain the existence of
financial markets and institutions as instrumentalities that lower the cost to individual
firms and households of coping with questionable information and uncertain events (see
Ohlson, 1987, Chapter 4).
Contemporary financial institutions offer both innovative and tried-and-true
opportunities for increasing or decreasing a customer’s exposures to informational risk
and event uncertainty.  In any given country, informationally disadvantaged parties
benefit when government supervision of banking institutions can assure that the
operations of these institutions are efficient, fair, and safe.
The three central tasks of bank supervisors and regulators are: (1) to control risks
of fraud and contract non-performance; (2) to operate a safety net designed to control
risks of fire-sale losses associated with FSF insolvencies and unjustified bank runs, and
(3) to operate the fraud controls and safety net honorably and at minimum cost to
taxpayers.  Wall and Eisenbeis (1999) focus on conflicts that complicate the pursuit of
such public-policy goals.  Minimizing regulatory costs entails striking an optimal balance
between the opportunity cost of government supervisory and disciplinary activities3
(“current regulation”) and future costs associated with variation in the probability and
severity of financial crises.  Economists take it as axiomatic that, if the incentives of
regulators were perfectly aligned with those of taxpayers, the optimal balance would be
struck.
This paper emphasizes that the balance struck by real-world regulators is distorted
by the brevity of their expected time in office and influenced by side payments that
regulatees and other powerful parties offer precisely to create incentive conflict.  It is
assumed throughout this paper that regulators earn short-term rents from adopting
policies that seek simultaneously: to facilitate a flow of cheap loans to politically favored
sectors; to cover up the impact that below-market loans have on banks’ net worth and
depositors’ loss exposures; and to protect banks in one of two ways.  The first method is
to help banks to preserve the existing market structure by limiting outside entry through
restrictions on the size, scope, and geographic origin of would-be competitors.  The other
method is to support weak and insolvent banks by giving them subsidized government
guarantees.  Support is eventually needed because the more politically directed credits a
nation’s banks book, the more their net worth is undermined.  With such subsidies (as,
e.g., in the U.S. Savings and Loan Mess), financial disaster can bubble beneath the
surface for years.
The paper explains that innovations in financial technology and regulatory
strategy discipline the opportunity costs of regulatory systems that are mismanaged in
either of these ways.  The goal of the analysis is to explain how competition from better-
adapted “alien” institutions –located offshore or in a more flexibly regulated domestic
sector-- hastens the breakdown of regulatory arrangements that artificially enhance short-
run bank profitability either by retarding efficient adjustments in a nation’s financial
market structure or by tolerating widespread insolvency among domestic competitors.
The analysis is Schumpeterian, in that ongoing technological and regulatory
innovations continually shock the system.  These shocks expand the margin of
competition from differently regulated financial institutions and lower the costs of
entering nontraditional markets or operating in distant lands.  Intensified alien
competition reduces the profitability of incumbent banks and enhances opportunities for4
informationally advantaged large domestic depositors in any country to protect
themselves from the burdens imposed on them by misregulation.
This double-barreled impetus to alien expansion is particularly disturbing in host
countries whose banking systems include a large number of economically insolvent
“zombie” institutions whose survival depends crucially on government-generated rents.
As the markets of such institutions are invaded, the government’s ability to sustain its
program of bank rents loses credibility.  The situation degenerates into crisis if and when
astute domestic depositors lose faith in the viability of government guarantees of zombie-
bank deposits.  Once this occurs, the movement of domestic balances into foreign banks
accelerates and zombie banks’ efforts to finance the deposit outflow unmasks their
hopeless condition.  Progressively less and less savvy customers lose confidence in the
government’s ability to keep their deposits safe and this puts increasing pressure on
authorities to revise and recapitalize their insolvency-resolution system.
This information-based view of the forces that determine the onset, costs, and
duration of crises in misregulated financial environments provides an alternative to the
classic herding models of Kindleberger (1978) and Minsky (1977) that attribute systemic
crises to contagious swings in market psychology.  In our misregulation theory of crisis,
technological change, microeconomic imbalances, weaknesses in accountability, and
distributional politics help to generate financial shocks and currency disequilibria.
Introducing these elements clarifies that optimal policy staregies for managing
disruptions caused by blocking information flows and stalling efficient adjustments in
market structure are far different from those that would be needed to counteract hysterical
mob responses to indications of banking and currency weakness.
I.  Cross-Country Competition in Regulatory Services
As with any other economic good, a market exists for regulatory services.
Potential purveyors of regulatory services are subject to market discipline from lower-
cost and/or higher-quality suppliers.  Whenever technological change lowers the cost or
raises the quality of services that can be provided by offshore regulators, the equilibrium
market structure of a country’s financial-regulation industry may be expected to become
less autarkic.5
Regulation is a class of service valued not for itself but for the benefits it confers
on those who produce and use the products of the regulated industry.  In effect, financial
services are supplied jointly by financial institutions and their regulators.  This jointness
means that international trade in financial services empowers customers to choose not
just between domestic and foreign suppliers of financial products but also between host-
country and home-country systems of regulation.  Customer choice in financial services
focuses not just on the stand-alone capacity of the institutions with which the customer
formally deals, but also on differences in the cost and quality of the supervisory and
guarantee services on which informationally disadvantaged customers rely to support the
liquidity and safety of the products selected.
Like the financial-services business itself, financial regulation is a relationship
business.  Regulated institutions and their regulators contract to do a range of repeat
business with each other for an indeterminate time.  Neither party can recontract either
moment to moment or transaction to transaction.  For either side to dissolve the
relationship, it must incur substantial switching costs.
Financial regulators seek to control the behavior of financial institutions and
markets to achieve specific purposes.  The cost and quality that institutional regulatees
can fairly attribute to services produced by a given regulatory enterprise depend on the
mix of purposes its managers pursue and on the efficiency with which these managers
accumulate and deploy enterprise resources.  Freer international trade in financial
services increases the intensity of cross-national regulatory competition.  As this
competition becomes more intense, unfair and inefficient operation of regulatory
enterprises becomes visible more quickly than before.  The more and sooner that a truly
inefficient regulator’s business is transferred to the jurisdiction of a better regulator, the
more and sooner deadweight burdens associated with inefficient patterns of regulatory
oversight can fade away.
On one side of each regulatory relationship, regulators proffer benefits to client
regulatees that engage in approved behaviors and threaten to impose penalties on
regulatees that evade their rules.  Although regulators seek a mix of public, bureaucratic,
and private benefits, in public discussion, officials are reluctant to acknowledge the
extent of their incentive conflicts.  This reluctance routinely misinforms the average6
taxpayer about what is at stake in proposals to make changes either in rules or in
enforcement practices.
On the other side of the relationship, regulatees look for permissible ways to
influence regulators to make favorable adjustments in the net burden that the regulatory
framework would otherwise impose.  The existence of this reverse channel of influence
reinforces the incentive conflicts that prevent regulators from being straightforward
servants of the public good.  Regulators’ incentive conflicts help to explain why in
practice consumer interests are often subordinated to producer interests (Stigler, 1971;
Pelzman, 1976; Becker, 1983) and why opportunities for foreign firms to enter host-
country financial-services markets are seldom free.
In any time and place, the operative framework of financial regulation reflects
past regulator and regulatee attempts to influence one another.  The interaction is simpler
in a closed economy with a single regulator than it is either in a nation with multiple
independent regulators or in an open economy in which foreign regulatory suppliers
compete for host-country business.  This is because regulatees’ ability --as dissatisfied
customers-- to bring pressure on a particular regulator expands as the number of in-
market regulators moves from one to many.
Social controls on the job performance of government regulators responsible for
overseeing the conduct of banking business and the safety and soundness of financial
institutions differ between developed and developing countries.  So do institutional
mechanisms for government intervention into bank lending decisions.  Although credit-
allocation mechanisms differ between the two types of countries, we take poor
information flows and incentive conflict in government policymaking to be common
features.  Both features delay the pace of modernization and allow bank insolvencies to
reach considerable depth before they become visible to the representative depositor.
In both kinds of countries, financial regulators subject foreign banks and the
foreign operations of domestic banks to patterns of regulation that differ importantly from
those that apply to domestic banking activities.  Three stylized asymmetries are studied
here.  First, most developed countries are willing to allow domestic banks to book a
wider range of risks in their foreign subsidiaries than they are prepared to tolerate at
home-country offices.  This is because relationships with internationally active customers7
are an especially footloose part of the banking business and because politicians don’t
expect to confront responsibility for foreign banking losses in domestic political arenas.
Second, barriers to the entry of foreign financial firms into local banking markets
customarily exist, but in recent years officials both in developed regions and in many
developing countries have been persuaded to relax these barriers.  Third, when large or
widespread insolvencies threaten, regulators are reluctant to encourage their traditional
regulatees to sell their franchises to firms that operate under the aegis of a different
regulator.
This paper seeks to incorporate these asymmetries into models of incentive-
conflicted regulatory competition in hopes of clarifying the interaction between
regulatory change and modern banking crises.  The paper analyzes the effects of layering
improved bank regulation in one country on top of a continuing series of technological
shocks to international banking and regulatory competition.  Improved regulation is
defined on two dimensions: (1) adopting a strategy of promptly resolving the insolvency
of zombie banks or (2) straightforwardly permitting regulatee banks to take advantage of
scale and scope economies.  Improved regulation is contrasted with inferior “traditional”
regulatory strategies that create market rents by (1) helping zombie banks to resist
pressure for exit or (2) resisting regulatee efforts to attain optimal size and scope.
To underscore the effect of regulatory lags, the technological shocks are assumed
to increases scale and scope economies at offshore banks or offices more quickly than at
domestic offices of host-country banks.  Year by year, technological change lowers the
marginal and average costs for offshore banks of coordinating overseas operations and of
managing a diverse product line.
Two models are considered.  In both models, banks enter from a financially
sophisticated country F whose taxpayers have made incumbent regulators accountable to
some degree for the social costs of misregulation.  In the first model, the competing
countries are both financially sophisticated, but one (named U for the U.S.) formally
restricts the size and product lines of its domestic institutions.  In U, how heavily these
restrictions weigh on opportunities to undertake technologically driven expansions in
optimal size and product lines is lessened by allocating supervisory authority over
differently chartered institutions to specialized regulators.  In the other model, we assume8
one country (designated as A, to stand for developing countries in Asia and Latin
America) has a single regulator that is committed to strategies of exit resistance.
Table 1 lays out the technological and regulatory differences featured in the two
models.  In the first model, regulatory competition focuses on restrictions on bank size
and scope.  In the second model, regulatory competition focuses on the sustainability of
government guarantees offered to depositors at troubled banks.
For concreteness, we assume that officials in U constrain the capital position and
profit-making activities of its domestic banks more severely than competing foreign
authorities do and more severely than safety-and-soundness considerations justify.  A
banking charter can be regarded as a government “license” that empowers its recipient to
offer a specific range of financial services to a specific range of domestic customers.
Bank charters in U fail to authorize many services on which a conscientious bank could
earn profits without shifting any new risks to the deposit-insurance fund.
U’s limited charter creates an additional motivation for offshore banks to enter a
financially sophisticated foreign region.  In particular, offices that banks in U open in
foreign financial centers can typically exercise a wider range of financial powers than
their U.S. banking charter would directly authorize.  Conversely, offices that foreign
banks open in the U can often deliver “nonbank” services to local customers more
straightforwardly (i.e., more cheaply) than local banks can.
In all countries, regulators are prepared at the margin to subsidize the
“international competitiveness” of their client banks’ offshore activity.  We assume that
regulatory subsidization of financial-services exports take the form of off-budget
government guarantees that are conveyed implicitly to obligations being booked in the
foreign offices of large home-country banks.  Because the subsidies are off-budget,
home-country authorities are imperfectly accountable for them.  This weakness in
accountability intensifies incentive conflicts that might lead regulators in F or U to delay
their response to technological shocks.  Agent authorities have to balance the safety-and-
soundness duties they owe their taxpayer-principals against the bureaucratic advantages
and laundered personal benefits that they can earn by expanding risk-shifting
opportunities for internationally active domestic and foreign banks.9
This framework of technological and regulatory evolution offers a potential
explanation for the delayed emergence of megabanks in the U.S. and for the character of
the profitability pressures that local banks have experienced in many developing
countries.  It portrays local banks’ market-share decline in traditional domestic markets
as a function of two forces: (1) low-cost foreign banks’ innovative entry into
nontraditional markets and (2) strategic responses made by incumbent competitors and
incentive-conflicted regulators in the invaded markets to the forecastable profit squeeze
that more-efficient outside competitors can create.
II. Market Structure of Regulatory Competition
Individual regulatory enterprises are multiproduct firms operating in imperfectly
contestable markets.  A market is a body of persons carrying on extensive and at least
partly voluntary transactions in a specific good or service.  Baumol, Panzar, and Willig
(1986) define an individual market as perfectly contestable when the costs of entering
and exiting the market are zero.  In a perfectly contestable market, the threat of hit-and-
run entry by potential outside competitors holds profit margins to competitive levels,
irrespective of the number of incumbent competitors or of the share of industry output
produced by the few largest competitors.
The demand for regulatory services is  derived from the demand for its regulatees’
products.  A particular regulator’s market share may be defined as the proportionate value
of overall financial-services business that is captured by the firms with which it has a
regulatory relationship.  When jurisdiction in particular markets is effectively shared with
other regulators, it is convenient to allocate the shared business according to the expenses
individual regulators incur in overseeing the shared activities.
In most democracies, the fairness and legitimacy of private and governmental
regulatory actions are tested by legislative oversight and judicial review.  Nevertheless,
even in countries where regulatory jurisdiction overlap, one may usually identify a
dominant regulatory firm.  In many countries, the central bank is politically strong
enough to impose some cartel-like discipline on other members of the domestic financial
regulatory industry.  In other countries, the ministry of finance takes the lead.  However,
as financial markets have globalized, even a country’s dominant domestic regulator has10
had to recognize that it is increasingly constrained by competition for regulatory business
with regulators from other countries.
Even in the face of globalization, a country’s market for regulatory services
remains imperfectly contestable --primarily because of costs associated with exit
resistance initiated or supported by government regulators.  This paper emphasizes that
for long periods government firms can hide losses and loss exposures from taxpayers.
This capacity to roll losses forward indefinitely imparts to government firms a potentially
defective short-run profitability constraint.  Concealing evidence of unprofitability
shortcircuits taxpayer discipline.  Moreover, a government regulator’s ability to resist exit
is strengthened by transition or switching costs that stand in the way of regulatees who
might otherwise signal the existence of the regulator’s unbooked losses by transferring
their regulatory business to a healthier supplier.
Differences in opportunity costs can explain what and whom various regulators
control.  Exogenous and endogenous disturbances in the economic environment affect
opportunities for regulators.  Regulatees and regulators respond jointly --albeit at
different speeds-- to the changing costs of entering and exiting specific financial product
markets.  Product-line and geographic-market expansion by regulatory suppliers follows
and supports rivalry between client financial-services firms within and across countries,
regions, and administrative divisions.
The theory of contestable markets unfolds from a hypothetical benchmark
equilibrium in which outside firms can effect a costlessly reversible entry into any
specific market.  The theory emphasizes the role of entry and exit costs as constraints on
private market-structure adjustment.  It is assumed that in all countries financial
regulators can be persuaded to sell freer entry privileges to low-cost foreign banks for an
appropriate side payment.  In December 1997, the willingness of the 102 members of the
World Trade Organization to accommodate foreign ownership of banking, securities, and
insurance firms was codified in a formal agreement.  Of course, full implementation of
the agreement is far in the future.  In many countries, implementation will require
additional political pressure to produce enabling legislation and be delayed by prolonged
negotiations.11
The key assumption in this paper’s application of contestability theory is that,
when foreign-bank entry is first deregulated, the costs to government officials of making
inefficient domestic firms exit become perversely higher.  This is because when foreign
entry is deregulated, authorities have personal and bureaucratic incentives to step up their
support of incumbent banks (Kane, 1991).  In responding this way, officials neglect a
concomitant economic duty to taxpayers.  If their sole goal was to minimize taxpayer risk
exposure in banks, regulators should tighten their prudential supervision of domestic
banks to allow individual-firm exits to ease the industry profit squeeze that foreign entry
is bound to create.  This delay in adapting supervisory strategy to the more globally
competitive banking environment conveys regulatory forbearances that accentuate the
role that implicit deposit guarantees play as an exit barrier that prolongs the lives of
insolvent “zombie” institutions.
Every financial-services firm (FSF) seeks to earn a healthy return on its equity
(ROE).  For ROE to be positive, the FSF’s return on its tangible and intangible assets
(ROA) must be large enough to create a positive net interest spread over its total funding
costs (ROL) over each business cycle.  Net interest spread (iS) is the profit margin that
exists between ROA and the explicit and implicit interest paid to funds suppliers.
To attract customers, foreign entrants must offer either innovative services or
better deals.  As their presence expands, they put downward pressure on the profit
margins and solvency of previously protected host-country banks. Because default-risk
allowances are booked at least partly as current income, reported profit spreads differ
from economic returns.  Reported spreads rise disproportionately during business
expansions and decline disproportionately (and even turn negative) during recessions.
On an opportunity-cost accounting basis, the profit squeeze renders the least-
efficient domestic banks insolvent.  This is merely to say that managers of these marginal
banks can no longer credibly project positive future profits on their traditional banking
business.
Were it not for the relief provided by explicit and implicit government guarantees
of bank liabilities, the creditors of each insolvent institution would force it either to be
recapitalized, liquidated, or absorbed by a stronger competitor in relatively short order.
However, existing accounting systems are disinformational enough to give host-country12
regulators and bank managers considerable discretion over how quickly damaged banks’
opportunity losses need to be booked and resolved.  This discretion encourages insolvent
banks to pressure host-country regulators to help them to resist exit as long as they can.
Modern analyses of how deposit insurance works emphasize two points.  First,
government officials’ incentives to monitor and control risk-taking by insolvent banks are
conflicted.  Even in financially sophisticated countries such as the U.S. and Japan,
deposit institutions serve to some extent as vehicles for allocating subsidized credit to
politically favored sectors (Pomerleano, 1997; Stiglitz, 1996).  No matter how much a
country’s politicians and regulators may concern themselves in the abstract with
internalizing externalities and promoting efficiency, they can extract personal and
bureaucratic reputational benefits from routing credit subsidies to grateful parties and
from delaying the resolution of losses at the banks that supply the favored credits.
Second, insured institutions that are allowed to operate in an insolvent condition have
incentives to engage in corrupt and excessively risky lending that, on average, may be
expected to deepen their insolvency, lessen the productivity of a nation’s aggregate real
investment, and shift responsibility for covering additional losses to taxpayers.
Regulatory resistance to winding up the affairs of troubled banks generates
implicit subsidies for undercapitalized domestic institutions.  These subsidies predictably
lessen the initial returns that a foreign entrant can earn.  Contestability theory interprets
this predictable dampening or negation of an entrant’s initial returns as an exit cost that
temporarily slows the pace of foreign entry.
III.  Industrial-Organization Analysis of the Effects of Foreign-Bank Entry
The European universal bank, the U.S. financial-services holding company, and
the Japanese keiretsu constitute alternative ways of bringing the specialized capacities of
banks, securities firms, insurance firms, and finance companies within a single
organization.  To abstract from charter-based differences in the character of financial-
institution services, it is convenient to conceive of financial institutions as purveyors of
informational services and deal-making instruments.  This lets us partition financial-
services business according to customers at which various services are directed:
1.  Corporate banking;13
2.  Private banking;
3.  Consumer banking.
In practice, offshore entrants into foreign financial markets have typically begun
by following their corporate customers into new locales.  We assume that, unlike the
host-country banks already operating in these new locales, offshore entrants are not asked
to serve as conduits for delivering subsidies to politically favored domestic sectors.  We
assume that prudent entrants open themselves to host-country customers gradually,
beginning by emphasizing asset-management, transactional, and informational services
for corporations and wealthy households that were not adequately available from onshore
firms.  This is prudent because informational advantages and management experience
possessed by incumbent banks make it costly for aggressive foreign entrants (such as
Japanese banks in Korea) to rapidly wean profitable customers away from a longstanding
banking relationship.  Except when incipient insolvency threatens, it is the relatively
unpromising disaster-prone borrower who would be most eager to build a full-service
relationship with an offshore institution.
Recognizing that incentive conflicts exist in host-country regulation would make
to reasonable for U.S. banks to conceive of crises in host country A as opportunities for
them to effect fuller entry.  In fact, for U.S. banks, movement into household banking has
progressed much further in countries in Latin America where crises have been more
frequent than it has in Asia.  When a country’s system for insuring domestic bank
deposits has broken down, offshore banks can lessen the need for host-country
governments to alienate voters by imposing new explicit taxes to resolve insolvencies.
Offshore banks can assist along two dimensions:
1.  by helping the host-country government to negotiate a package of financial
assistance from foreign institutions and multinational institutions such as the
IMF (Todd, 1991) and
2.  by helping host-country officials to boost customer confidence by letting
offshore banks absorb and recapitalize insolvent domestic banking franchises
without a public accounting for the ways that host-country authorities may
previously have damaged local institutions by saddling them with politically
instigated loans.14
Our first model sharpens the contrast between the regulatory environments of U
and F by assuming that country F charters domestic banks and foreign subsidiary
institutions as fully empowered universal banks.  Neglecting international differences in
tax rates, this assumption implies that a restricted U.S. bank’s explicit earnings on its
operations in developed country F are likely to omit the indirect contribution that foreign
operations make to profits booked at home.  If restricted banks use the opportunity to
book innovative home-country business in their foreign offices as a way of competing for
home-country business with differently chartered foreign and domestic financial firms,
the indirect benefits of foreign operations in cementing home-country customer
relationships are apt to be recorded as home-country profits.
Claessens, Demirguç-Kunt and Huizenga (1997) examine the extent and
profitability of foreign ownership in 80 national banking markets.  In line with our
modelling, these authors find that foreign banks function very differently in developed
and developing countries and that foreign banks report higher profits than (presumably
higher-risk) domestic banks in developing countries, but earn lower returns than home-
country banks in developed-country venues.
IV.  Conflicted Incentive Structures in Financial Regulation
Regulation represents an attempt by one party to control the behavior of another.
However, in financial regulation, it is sometimes hard to be sure who is the controller and
who is the controllee (Stigler, 1971; Pelzman, 1976).
Regulated institutions control their regulators in several ways: by offering the
“carrots” of subtle and unsubtle side payments and by threatening to wield the “lash” of
public criticism and the loss of budget-generating regulatory relationships.  By incurring
the switching costs of executing a straightforward charter flip or engaging in a more
sophisticated bit of organizational engineering, a regulated institution may migrate some
or all of its future business from a burdensome regulatory environment to a more
congenial one.
Regulated institutions seek benefits from their regulatory relationships.
Regulatory benefits include the provision of certification and networking services that
can build customer confidence and convenience and the deployment of regulatory15
controls on individual-firm entry and exit that can convey market power to the regulatees.
Of course, regulatees want benefits to be produced at low cost to themselves.  This puts
banks on the lookout for strategies of organizational, locational, and product innovation
that can reduce their firm-wide net burden of regulation (NBR).
Rewards for relaxing burdens are routinely proffered to regulators by their client
base.  In responding to regulatee requests and arbitrage-like organizational adjustments,
regulators pursue --under statutory, budgetary, and competitive restraints-- not just their
acknowledged social goals but also socially less-defensible personal and bureaucratic
benefits.  In rewriting their rules to confront a client innovation, regulators either re-
impose or relax their net regulatory burdens.  In the face of technological innovations that
increase scale and scope economies, pressure for relaxations is intensified by competition
for regulatory relationships from imperfectly accountable foreign purveyors of regulatory
services.
The Regulatory Dialectic portrays private financial institutions and home-country
and host-country regulators as locked into an unending game of strategy (Kane, 1991).
Each side pursues its own goals and restraints in the knowledge that technological change
is occurring and that other parties set their strategies adaptively.  Our first model channels
financial innovations through the Regulatory Dialectic to help us to understand decisions
about how to locate and charter a U.S. bank’s activities across different states and
nations.
The Regulatory Dialectic offers a “struggle model” of how regulatory patterns
evolve.  The model establishes a parallel between regulatory competition and Hegelian
sequences of conflict and change.  In a Hegelian sequence, the opposition of a thesis and
its antithesis produces a synthesis and each new synthesis is immediately opposed by an
antithesis of its own.  The opposing (i.e., antithetical) forces featured in the Regulatory
Dialectic are straightforward ones: (1) attempts to impose net regulatory burdens (defined
as the amount by which compliance costs exceed associated benefits) on selected private
activities and (2) partially offsetting arbitrage-like avoidance activity by regulatees that
seeks --often with the cooperation of an alternative regulator-- to find or devise
regulatory loopholes and to put business through these loopholes in circumventive ways.
Managers’ purpose is to lighten their bank’s firmwide net regulatory burden.  Regulators’16
purposes entail tradeoffs between their overt social mission and covert bureaucratic and
personal ends.
Avoidance exists whenever a regulation is burdensome, and regulatory arbitrage
opportunities expand whenever innovations occur or regulatory competition intensifies.
Regulatory arbitrage counters and disrupts the distributional and allocative effects of
politically driven efforts to intervene in financial markets.  Moreover, exposure to
regulatory arbitrage underscores the incentive conflicts that regulatory officials face.
With fixed technology and free trade in financial and regulatory services, competitive
reregulation would impose a Law of One Net Regulatory Burden in the long run.
Burdens would be equalized across regulators because otherwise high-burden regulators
would eventually lose all their rents as the borders of their domain implode.
Whenever a tentative market-structure equilibrium is disturbed either by the
promulgation of new rules or by technological support for new avoidance strategies, the
collision of forces is renewed.  Each new collision begets new regulatory schemes (re-
regulation) and new sets of loopholes.  Under the spur of technological change and cross-
national regulatory competition, incentive-conflicted re-regulation may be expected more
often to narrow or to legitimize newfound loopholes than to plug them completely.  As
technological change or competitive reregulation pushes marginal avoidance costs below
the costs of compliance and enforcement, re-regulation is pushed inexorably in the
direction of deregulation.
In the face of a cost-reducing sequence of technological change, the Regulatory
Dialectic envisions repeating stages of regulatory avoidance (or “loophole mining”) and
re-regulation, with a long-lasting equilibrium impossible to obtain.  In particular, a
completely deregulated state, if achieved, would almost certainly contain profitable
opportunities for some players to invest in developing and wielding political clout.
Incentives would exist to search for and exploit opportunities to build coalitions of firms
who could at least temporarily benefit from accumulating political power and using this
power to constrain the economic behavior of others.
The usefulness of the Regulatory Dialectic lies in making sense of the time
patterns and character of observed sequences of financial and regulatory innovation.  It
emphasizes that adaptations made mutually by regulators and regulatees cumulatively17
reshape the financial environment, particularly the parts of the environment that are
featured in our first model: those defined by charter-based rules, institutional structures,
and product lines.  The theory stresses that regulators have covert goals that tend to
compromise their social mission when officials are imperfectly accountable.  This
incentive conflict can explain repetitive regulatory deficiencies as part of a sequence of
politically constrained market-structure equilibria rather than as a series of foolish and
inexplicable mistakes.
Binding regulation that forecloses legitimate profit opportunities for one set of
private competitors creates incentives for less-regulated producers of substitute financial
services to invade these competitors’ markets.  Successful regulatory arbitrageurs
effectively enter the regulated market by devising innovative activities, structures, and
products that use newly available technologies to cleverly substitute for regulated
products.  At the same time, the burdens that fall on the targeted regulatees and their
customers generate bureaucratic and personal rewards for regulators who are willing to
cooperate in making the binding regulation less burdensome.  This mixture of regulation-
induced innovation and innovation-induced re-regulation reshapes market institutions and
politically imposed restraints on private financial activities in a Hegelian manner.  An
endless series of conflicts between alternating exercises of economic and political power
is simultaneously resolved and renewed.
V.  Introducing Reduced Costs of Overseas Operation into the Dialectical Process
It is convenient to assume that the process starts from an initial cross-national
equilibrium in banking and regulatory competition.  We disturb this equilibrium by
assuming a once-over improvement in the credibility of foreign guarantees and a steady
advance in information, contracting, and decision-support technology.  This disturbance
has two effects.  First, the improved technology leads the home-country corporate
customers of banks in U and F to expand their real activity into additional foreign
markets.  Banks in U and F can now more easily extend their customer servicing capacity
to follow their customers into the new locales.  Second, the same technological changes
progressively lower the costs of managing overseas and diverse banking operations and18
raise the sustainable long-run interest spread that large U.S. and foreign banks can
anticipate earning from expanding into offshore markets.
This improved profit opportunity leads some banks to contract to offer permissibly
laundered compensation (L) both to their home-country regulator (to look favorably on
offshore expansion) and to their offshore regulator (to permit greater foreign penetration
of offshore markets in A and F).  Technological change that asymmetrically lowers the
cost function of conducting foreign or interregional operations generates a war chest of
value that can be used by internationally active banks in U and F to bid for new
regulatory privileges at home and abroad.
The compensation that global and domestic banks are willing to offer cannot
exceed (and will usually be less than) the projected present discounted value to them of
the entry privileges they obtain.  We suppose --purely for expositional convenience-- that
rents L earned by regulators are proportional to the market shares of their regulatees, that
all costs are nonjoint, and that the size of the sustainable financial revenues that can be
generated each year in U, F, and A are fixed.  This implies that the equilibrium costs and
revenues accrued by banks chartered by each country depend on their shares of each
market and that regulators’ incentives to earn rents focus on market shares as well.
Of course, the kinds of costs banks from U incur in A and F differ importantly.  In
entering the financially and politically sophisticated markets of U or F, the expenses a
foreign bank incurs to cope with differences in information flows and legal structures are
not much different from those it incurs at home.  However, in the developing-country
venue of A, one would expect a foreign bank to find it dramatically harder to verify
customer-supplied data, to judge and monitor creditworthiness, and to enforce lender
rights.
Assuming that regulatory permissions can be negotiated on satisfactory terms,
foreign entry makes previously segmented financial markets in U, F, and A more
competitive.  The long-run effect of the greater interpenetration of domestic and foreign
financial markets is to change the global equilibrium market structure for both financial
activity and financial regulation.  But the transition time and political stress of moving to
this new equilibrium is apt to increase with the amount of foreign entry involved.  The
optimal expansion of foreign entrants entails a politically and bureaucratically painful19
shrinking of both the market share served by higher-cost incumbent domestic competitors
and the rents for domestic regulators that these incumbents generate.
By framing this shrinkage as a dangerous loss of national economic autonomy,
regulatees make it easier for short-horizoned government regulators to adopt policies that
delay their loss of rents by forcing taxpayers to help incumbent competitors to resist exit.
When exit resistance is not highly subsidized, the transition to the new equilibrium
market structure need not by itself disrupt the macroeconomy.  In the absence of life-
sustaining subsidies, the best opportunity for higher-cost institutions is often to negotiate
a turnkey voluntary sale of their already-operating banking franchise to a lower-cost
entrant.  This is because takeovers create value for a would-be entrant by allowing its
managers to secure and consolidate first-mover advantages for their brand name by
building a strong physical presence with minimal delay.  During the 1990s within the
United States, takeovers have greatly smoothed market-structure adjustments both in
interstate banking (Kane, 1996) and in cross-industry combinations of banking and
securities firms.
However, the more strongly deposit-insurance guarantees subsidize exit
resistance, the more stressful the transition to the new global equilibrium becomes for
other sectors.  The short-run effect of unfettered market entry by technologically well-
adapted low-cost out-of-market competitors is to disadvantage the host country’s
previously subsidized borrowing sector and to narrow interest margins in the banking
markets entered.  This process would facilitate the movement of real resources to
domestic activities whose credit had not previously been subsidized and keep borrowing
rates low until the departure of inefficient banks would have moved the financial market
structure to its new long-run equilibrium.
When exit is blocked, negative profit margins increase the time and energy that
threatened domestic bankers must devote to politicking and raise expected future
resolution costs for host-country deposit insurers (as modelled by Hiemstra, Kane,
Lutton, and Swamy, 1997).  Painful pressure is exerted on both ends of bank profit
margins.  Fund-raising becomes tougher, as troubled firms with their backs to the wall
draw on underpriced government guarantees to force unsustainably high explicit and
implicit interest rates to be paid to savers.  On the revenue side of the profit margin,20
competition from these same domestic firms pushes asset returns to unsustainably low
levels.
Throughout any period of prolonged exit resistance, narrowed profit margins
translate into below-market returns on foreign and domestic bank equity.  When and as
the new equilibrium market structure is reached in a given country, the return on bank
equity returns to a sustainable level.  The incentive structure under which regulators
operate in the two countries importantly affects how quickly the temporarily below-
market returns promote exit and re-allocate private capital and market share away from
strictly domestic banks and toward more-efficient real enterprise.
The series of rolling banking crises the world has experienced during the 1980s
and 1990s is consistent with our model of information-revealing competition between
incentive-conflicted financial regulators in developed and developing countries.  Across
regions as diverse as North America, Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and
the Far East, individual-country regulators have allowed low-cost foreign entrants to
expand their presence in local banking markets and gone on to subsidize the funding
interest rates paid by “zombie” domestic banks whose losses from politically directed
loans are covered up by accounting trickery years on end (Caprio and Klingebeil, 1996).
Exit resistance wanes in a given country when and as the depth of cumulative
economic insolvencies at domestic institutions leads knowledgeable bank creditors to
rationally doubt that country’s taxpayers will be willing or able much longer to make
taxpayers support the cumulative value of their government’s implicit guarantees.  At this
point, deposit and capital outflows from the subsidized banking sector begin to reveal
bank insolvencies even to informationally disadvantaged customers.  This sudden
surfacing of adverse information puts exit pressure on the troubled banks and on their
previously favored borrowing customers.  It also disrupts credit flows to the larger real
economy in which these sectors are imbedded.  The need to resolve the underlying
insolvencies eventually creates takeover opportunities for efficient local competitors and
allows high-tech banks from financially sophisticated countries to expand their presence
in foreign retail banking by acquiring and recapitalizing insolvent host-country banking
franchises.21
Applying the two models to the U.S. banking scene today clarifies that market-
structure adjustments have been moving simultaneously along three trajectories.  The first
trajectory entails an ongoing increase in the average size and efficiency of U.S.
competitors and an ongoing expansion in the range of product offerings at large banking
organizations.  To analyze events within the U.S. with the first model, we need only
reinterpret F as an alien regional or product segment of U.S. financial markets.  Here,
subsidized exit resistance by specialized regulators and state legislatures has largely
played itself out.  The wave of financial-institution megamergers that the U.S. is
experiencing in the late 1990s has been unleashed by a massive reduction in government-
supported exit resistance.  Along the second path, regulatory market discipline is
reducing differences in the product lines that differently chartered domestic and foreign
institutions can permissibly offer customers in onshore U.S. markets.  Here, equalization
is slowed by residual conflicts over domestic U.S. regulatory turf and by pressure to grant
foreign institutions the same privileges in the U.S. that they enjoy at home or that home-
country regulators give to U.S.-based institutions that operate on their soil.  Although
some incentive conflict remains, U.S. megamergers promise to help U.S. institutions to
win back from foreign institutions an increased share of U.S. financial business.  On the
third path, U.S. institutions are competing with global banks for business in financial
centers and for additional market penetration into Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin
America.  This transition is uncovering a rich lode of unresolved incentive conflict
between regulators and taxpayers in host countries.
V.  The Role of Regulatory Competition in U.S. Megamergers
The net regulatory burden imposed by any regulator is the gross burden that its
regulations place on regulatee profit opportunities minus the benefits regulatees receive
in the form of enhancements in customer convenience, customer confidence, and market
power.  Regulators that impose burdensome regulations on the industry segment they
supervise invite penetration of this segment’s markets by more lightly regulated domestic
and foreign competitors.  At the same time, regulators that offer favorable burdens
improve opportunities for their regulatees to enter markets in which the traditional
competitors face more-oppressive regulatory burdens.22
The dialectical model of competitive reregulation draws an intuitive
correspondence between a regulator’s net burden and a business firm’s product price.  In
a stationary state, this model would imply a Global Law of One Net Regulatory Burden.
The idea that reregulation is a competitive process also implies that the successful de
facto capture of extended powers by a favorably regulated class of institution would tend
to evoke a lagged authorization of these powers by the regulators whose markets are
invaded.
Role of Competition Among Banking, Thrift, and Credit Union Regulators Within the U.S.
From the day the Federal Reserve opened in 1914, Fed officials have competed
for federal regulatory jurisdiction with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC).  In turn, both agencies have competed for regulatory relationships with state
banking departments as well as with foreign regulators and domestic regulators in other
financial sectors.
Regulatory competition encourages agency heads to issue rulings designed to reduce their
clients’ net burden.  If scale or scope economies exist, an efficient way to do this is by steadily
expanding the range of activities their clients can licitly perform or the range of customers they
can serve.  The literature on scale and scope economies in banking is reviewed and criticized in
Ors (1998).  Although the data sets studied most intensively were assembled from surveys that
systematically excluded the nation’s largest banks, well into the 1980s empirical research found
no evidence that scale and scope economies in U.S. banking were large.
As long as scale and scope economies remained small, restrictions on bank mergers and
acquisitions and on banking powers would not be expected to generate enough of a net
regulatory burden to generate much avoidance activity.  Conversely, if as assumed here,
technological change has cumulatively increased scale and scope economies over time, the
Regulatory Dialectic predicts that avoidance activity would accelerate and eventually destroy the
enforceability of activity and locational restrictions and the solvency of banks whose survival
depended on these restrictions.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the leadership of both the OCC and the Fed
increasingly committed themselves to expanding the businesses that banking
organizations could enter, while seeking to maintain barriers that impeded the entry of
securities, insurance, and nonfinancial firms into banking.  The Fed focused its play on23
expanding the geographic reach and securities powers of bank holding-company (BHC)
affiliates, and endeavored to keep nonbanks out of banking by restricting the character of
corporations that could licitly affiliate with a bank.  The OCC concentrated on expanding
insurance and annuity powers for national banks and on extending the operating powers
of subsidiaries directly owned by a national bank.  To stabilize the incentive for state-
chartered institutions to switch to an OCC charter, 44 state legislatures have passed
legislation --so-called “wild-card statutes” -- which either authorizes automatically or
empowers state regulators to authorize their regulatees to perform any activity that
becomes permissible for national banks.
Similarly, although challenged by bank-sponsored lawsuits, the National Credit
Union Administration has steadily liberalized its interpretation of what links might
constitute a “common bond” among credit-union members.  It and Congress have also
expanded the powers federal credit unions can licitly perform, including their capacity for
business lending.
The powers of thrift institutions were similarly broadened in the 1980s and the
Office of Thrift Supervision (and its predecessor agency) have long had the competitive
ability --through what is known as the Unitary Thrift Holding Company (UTHC)
loophole-- to grant a thrift charter to financial and nonfinancial corporations whose mix
of activities would render them ineligible to acquire a bank.  But until the S&L insurance
mess was resolved, few large diversified corporations thought it profitable to enter what
threatened to be a moribund industry.  For decades, the attractiveness of a thrift charter to
diversified acquirers was lessened by requirements to maintain a portfolio heavily
specialized in housing finance and to shoulder prospectively a substantial share of the
costs of bailing out the massively insolvent Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) and its successor fund.
By relaxing these burdens in 1996, Congress intensified nonbank interest in the UTHC
loophole as a portal into banking activities.  First, Congress allowed thrifts to hold more
diversified portfolios by easing the qualified thrift lender test and raising the permissible amount
of commercial loans that a federal thrift could book.  Second, it recapitalized the Savings
Association Insurance Fund in a way that sharply lowered prospective deposit-insurance costs24
for thrifts.  Vis à vis banking regulators, both changes boosted the potential regulatory market
share of the Office of Thrift Supervision.
The Benefits of Megamergers
Whether one looks at the distribution of loans, deposits, or assets, foreign banks made
dramatic inroads into U.S. banking markets during the 1970s and 1980s.  During these same
decades, most of the largest U.S. banks were displaced from lists of the top 25 banks in the
world.
The theory of competitive reregulation tells us that the transfer of domestic market share
to banks under the aegis of foreign regulators would dispose U.S. legislators and regulators
toward helping the largest U.S. banks to expand their market share to restore their global
industry ranking.  Indeed, U.S. regulators were the major sponsors of the negotiations that
resulted in other G-10 countries establishing risk-based capital standards that formalized
traditional U.S. supervisory schemes (Wagster, 1996).
However, within the U.S., technological change had to make economies of scale and
scope important enough to large banks to justify the political effort needed to overcome the
domestic interests that benefited from restricting the size and market power of large banks.
Limits on interstate operations were sponsored, not by competing foreign banks, but by
coalitions of small domestic banks.  In addition, limits on bank product lines were used within
government to compartmentalize domestically jealously-guarded cross-industry regulatory and
Congressional Committee domestic turf.
What sources of value are unleashed in a megamerger?  Although proponents of financial
megainstitutions routinely project ex ante reductions in operating costs, megamergers are seldom
able to realize large resource savings ex post.  This supports the hypothesis that the economies of
scale and scope that banks are realizing in the 1990s come from a combination of three items:
increased pricing power, revenue enhancements from geographic market extension, and
increased political clout (Kane, 1998a).
A megamerger inevitably expands the range of an organization’s geographic servicing
capacity and its customer base.  The aim of a megainstitution is not so much to lower its costs as
to position itself to serve a larger segment of world markets.  Like a Coke or MacDonalds, a
brand name like Chase or Citigroup can be exported worldwide.  It may even be that brand-based25
economies of scale and scope in marketing have to overcome diseconomies that exist in
managing farflung service production and portfolio operations.
Reinforcing brand-name economies is the likelihood that net regulatory benefits increase
nonlinearly with an institution’s size and scope.  Products carrying the brand of a U.S.
megainstitution may be presumed to convey subsidized informal guarantees from the U.S.
government to their users.  It is hard for incentive-conflicted regulators to manage the loss
exposure that such guarantees pass through to taxpayers.  The larger and more important a given
institution becomes, the harder it becomes for U.S. regulators to discipline.  For example, the
very conception of the merger between Citicorp and Travelers presumed that the partners could
pressure government officials into guiding the deal around longstanding laws and rules that, on
their face, would seem to outlaw the combination.
Some elements of the Citigroup merger will have to be undone unless authorities remove
a series of statutory and regulatory impediments.  If these impediments are not ameliorated,
Citigroup could be forced either to divest itself of important insurance and securities operations
or to restructure the combination to squeeze it through something like the Unitary Thrift Holding
Company loophole.  Precisely because the powers of thrift institutions have greatly expanded
during the last 20 years, the Office of Thrift Supervision could grant Citicorp a thrift charter that
would let it do most of the things it now does under a bank charter.  Activities that remain
impermissible could be restructured as asset securitizations or transferred to other subsidiaries of
the UTHC.
VI.  The Role of Disinformational Accounting in the Buildup of Banking-System
Vulnerability
Framing financial crises as purely macroeconomic phenomena predisposes an
analyst to attribute the onset of accounting losses and institutional collapse to swings in
mob psychology (Kindleberger, 1978; Minsky, 1977).  In these now-canonical models, a
financial system becomes vulnerable when securities and bank loans become irrationally
overvalued by the mob.  The system’s aggregate vulnerability becomes progressively
greater the longer the mob persists in its overvaluation.  Panic ensues when the mob over-
reacts to a real or imagined series of disruptive shocks.  The excessive piercing of the
overvaluation bubble leads to a panic-driven deflation in asset prices that creates bargains
for level-headed investors.  The eventual success these investors achieve leads mob26
psychology back into an era of good feeling that ends when boom times transport the
mob’s mind back to irrational optimism again.
The analysis developed in this section seeks to trace mob overvaluation of bank
assets in modern economic booms to disinformation.  It attributes boom-time
overvaluation in large part to deceptive accounting practices at banks that are reinforced
by half-true assurances from incentive-conflicted government regulators.
Disinformational activity is designed to support the unsustainably contradictory policy
mix summarized in Table 2.  The contradictions are rooted in redistributive interest-group
competition for income-redistributing government credit subsidies.  Authorities end up
encouraging banks to lend on submarginal investment projects, to book the loans that
finance these projects at above-market values, and to leverage their overvalued loan
holdings in a vulnerability-enhancing way.
Disinformation is produced when an informed party carefully spins the facts it
knows in an effort to lead less informed observers to a false conclusion.  The tools of the
disinformer are omission, exaggeration and mischaracterization.  Unfavorable points are
not allowed to register in the discussion, favorable indications are overemphasized, and
the overall implications of the facts examined are deliberately misinterpreted.
The model of crisis is laid out in Table 3.  This model has some features in
common with Dooley (1997).  Government guarantees of bank liabilities curtail depositor
incentives to take action to protect themselves against overstatement of bank asset values
unless and until the government’s ability to make good on its guarantees comes seriously
into doubt.  Customer testing of bank asset values passes from unwelcome deposit
outflows into open crisis when and if the bureaucracy supporting deposit guarantees
begin to seize up.  To ameliorate the crisis, the political system must allocate a substantial
portion of the banking system’s imbedded losses across stockholders, creditors, and
taxpayers at home and abroad.  In any short-run fixup, the larger the amount of losses that
officials leave unallocated the sooner the system is apt to fall back into crisis again.
Although a banking or currency crisis usually surfaces with unpredictable
suddenness, most crises percolate over a long gestation period.  What the public
perceives to be a “banking crisis” is best understood as the surfacing of a longstanding
struggle to finance the costs of using banks as a conduit for delivering income-27
redistributing credit subsidies to favored economic sectors.  In an open crisis, the struggle
seeks to allocate across society an unpaid bill for opportunity losses that have
accumulated or are still accumulating at banks.  In managing an open banking crisis, the
remedies that are available to policymakers cut a wider swath through society than prior
use of preventive remedies of regulatory discipline would have.  Until a breakdown
actually surfaces, policymakers expect to be able to leave office with their reputations
unscathed.  No matter how many ounces of cure a foresighted ounce of prevention might
be worth to unwary taxpayers, the short horizons of top officials make it easy for banks
and politically favored borrowers to join together to restrain the exercise of preventive
regulatory measures.  Such a coalition undermines the case for prevention by putting
heavy lobbying pressure on short-horizoned government officials and by reinforcing this
pressure with well-placed side payments.
During the period of loss generation, evidence of the country’s financial fragility
remains fairly subtle.  Bank and government accountants are urged to offset evidence-
based warnings from academics and other critics with cleverly assembled flows of
comforting disinformation.  For banks, disinformational accounting focuses on finding
ways: to distort the timing of earnings and losses; to keep losses from being posted on
income statements and balance sheets; and to overstate the book values of assets and
understate the book values of liabilities.
It is easy to show that booking at par a bank loan that is made at a preferential
interest rate overvalues that loan.  The algebra is particularly straightforward if we
assume away uncertainty and suppose that the loans are perpetuities that banks expect
never to call or write off.  For concreteness, let us assume that the borrower pays interest
at a rate that is 90 percent of the interest rate at which an informed lender would accept
the loan.  Even at the moment the loan is made and if no signs of trouble emerge, in the
secondary market each dollar of the subsidized loan (LS) is equal to only 90 percent of





Suppose that in a given country each bank holds 10 percent of its assets in cash
reserves and splits the rest of its assets between subsidized and unsubsidized assets.  Even
if no formal defaults occur on any of the assets it holds, each bank has hidden (i.e.,28
“unbooked”) losses that amount to 4.5 percent of reported assets.  If the markdown rate
implied by the interest-rate subsidy is denoted by x and the percentage of subsidized
assets is written as s, the hidden losses imbedded in bank assets would be (1-x)(s) times
outstanding assets A.  Unless they also receive subsidized deposit guarantees, private
banks participating in such a credit-allocation scheme would be insolvent unless the book
value of their assets (A) exceeded the market value of their deposits (D) by more than
(1-x)sA.  Stated generally, the market value of owners’ enterprise-contributed equity
position (MVE) in an unguaranteed bank would be:
MVE = A-s(1-x)A-D. (1)
In the example where s=.45 and x=.9, solvency requires MVE = .955A-D>0, which may
be rewritten as the requirement that deposits be kept from exceeding 95.5 percent of the
book value of assets.
When a country’s banks are pressured to book more and more subsidized loans
over time, it is easy for MVE to turn negative.  To get banks to participate voluntarily in
such a scheme, a government must either reduce the net risk exposure of the lender by
guaranteeing the timely receipt of borrower payments or it must offer participating banks
other subsidies of equal or greater value.  We model the case where the subsidy takes the
form of offering banks deposit insurance that reduces the interest cost depositors charge
the bank by d percent per year.  We let f represent the fee the government charges per
dollar of deposits guaranteed.  The net annual subsidy (SN) an insured bank receives for
participating in the joint credit-allocation/guarantee system becomes:
SN = dD - (1-x) sA - fD
     = (d-f) D- (1-x) sA. (1)
The discounted present value of projected annual subsidies may be described as
the value of a bank’s government-contributed net worth (NG).  If the annual subsidy is
expected to continue for exactly T years, its discounted present value can be calculated as
the value of a perpetuity with coupon SN minus the present discounted value that would
be lost by selling the perpetuity for forward delivery at T.  Hence, if the market return on



































Clearly, NG comes closer and closer to the perpetuity value SN/rb as T becomes larger and
larger.
As an intangible going-concern value, NG is part of the market capitalization
(MC) of each participating bank:
MC = MVE + NG. (3)
Whenever a bank is allowed to operate with negative MVE, NG must be larger in
magnitude than MVE.  When enterprise-contributed equity is negative, a bank may be
described as a “zombie” institution.  The zombie metaphor emphasizes the idea that an
insolvent bank enjoys an unnatural existence, in that its debt and stock trade entirely on
the strength of credible outside guarantees.  The deeper a bank’s insolvency, the more
closely its owners’ claim on future profits resembles a lottery ticket.  The claim will pay
off only as long as regulators unwisely allow dividends to be distributed or events return
MVE to a positive value again.  Returning to solvency requires the bank to earn returns
large enough to erase its imbedded capital shortfall and push the value of government-
contributed net worth back below MC again.
However, the ability of a government to deliver a gross annual subsidy equal to
(d-f)D depends on taxpayer willingness and capacity to make good on its promises.  To
keep taxpayers from recognizing the costs that the subsidy system imposes as implicit tax
obligations on the rest of society, government officials typically put a propagandistic spin
on the already rosy information they receive from bank accounting reports.  Their goal is
to convince a trusting public that bank supervisors are on the job.  Understating the size
of aggregate bank losses and loss exposures serves to exaggerate the strength of
government deposit-insurance reserves.  During the final stages of a pre-crisis period of
loss generation, government spin doctors are apt also to understate the size of ongoing
declines in a country’s foreign-exchange reserves and the extent of capital flight.
Of course, as the loss-generation period lengthens, visible signs of economic
weakness increasingly challenge the credibility of government and bank disinformation
Vis-à-vis equation (2), the projected values of both S and T fall.  Visible signs of the
resulting decline in NG include: the emergence of a “country premium” in the interest
rates that a nation’s banks must pay to foreign lenders; disappointing downturns in the30
country’s credit rating and corporate profits; and downward pressure on foreign-exchange
rates and the prices of domestic assets.
The slow emergence of disinformation-refuting signs of bank weakness gradually
shifts the basis for rational depositor assessments of the safety of deposit claims on
credit-allocating banks through three stages.  In the first stage, informed depositors place
increasingly less reliance on the value of each troubled bank’s stockholder-contributed
net worth and increasingly more reliance on at the value of explicit and implicit
government guarantees of the bank’s obligations.  Bank runs seldom occur when bad
loans and investments first convert a bank into a hopelessly insolvent “zombie”
institution.  This is because in the minds of a bank’s creditors government guarantees can
and do substitute for stockholder-contributed net worth as long as the government’s
capacity to shift bank losses to taxpayers remains beyond doubt.
In the second stage, the cumulative value of government guarantees grows to a
worrisome size.  As a result, informed depositors begin to pay more and more attention to
the possibility that the government may be unable to collect the funds necessary to keep
bank creditors whole.  Doubts surfacing about authorities’ willingness or ability to force
taxpayers to bond the liabilities of an economically insolvent banking system motivate a
series of “silent runs.”  These silent runs begin when the nation’s most sophisticated
depositors first recognize that assets in the country’s combined banking and deposit-
insurance system cannot cover the claims of bank depositors unless they are
supplemented by a frighteningly large injection of funds secured explicitly or implicitly
by the credit of domestic or foreign taxpayers.  As savvy depositors come to reinterpret
past economic disinformation as a collection of deliberately misleading claims, they have
a growing incentive to test the government’s willingness to bail out bank depositors.
They do this by demanding that their bank either pay them higher interest rates than other
customers and/or collateralize their claims.  As more depositors grasp the extent to which
the aggregated resources of the banking and guarantee system are unable to cover
aggregate obligations, bank runs become less silent and improved news coverage renders
further government and industry disinformation harder and harder for less informed
depositors to swallow.  In such circumstances, the third stage of open crisis ensues.31
In modern crises, offshore banking competition has progressively shortened
individual-country loss-generation periods.  It has done this in at least two ways.  First,
even where foreign banks limit their entry into a host-country market to selected
corporate and private banking services, their presence offers safe substitutes for deposits
held in host-country banks.  The availability of these substitutes lowers the costs to host-
country depositors of engaging in silent runs.  Second, the greater safety of the deposit
substitutes offered onshore and offshore by foreign banks traces in part to the implicit and
explicit performance guarantees that offshore entrants bring with them from the
regulatory systems of their homelands.  Liberalization of international capital movements
and the globalization of banking markets inevitably put the costs and benefits that host-
country systems generate in protecting local banks into closer competition with the
guarantees produced by regulatory systems in major financial centers.
The footholds that offshore banks have scored in Asian and Latin American
countries may be interpreted as evidence that a technologically driven passage to a more-
globalized market structure for financial regulation is underway.  If we adopt an
industrial-organization perspective, Schumpeterian theory would tell us to interpret the
series of rolling financial crises experienced in the 1980s and 1990s as sequences of
creative destruction.  The suffering induced by each crisis is a transition cost that society
pays to stop the accumulation of disinformation and to shrink the domain of a high-cost
or inequitable regulator.
The short-run bad news revealed by each crisis is to size some of the
inefficiencies and inequities that political maneuvering was able to produce when the
government of the affected country enjoyed monopoly power in its domestic “onshore”
market for regulatory services.  Viewing such inefficiencies and inequities as supported
by laundered side payments that the real and financial sectors channel to government
officials clarifies how hard it is for taxpayers to mount a movement to write more-
accountable public-service employment contracts with government officials.
Nevertheless, the good news is that, by constraining the equilibrium rents officials can
use banks to extract in individual countries, increased offshore regulatory competition
promises to stop the loss-generation process at an earlier date and at a less costly level.  It32
can also create cross-national pressure to improve public-service employment contracts in
the long run.
VII.  The Impact of FDICIA and the Risk-Based Capital Agreement on International
Banking Competition
Since the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) was enacted in December 1991,
global U.S. banks have greatly extended their charter powers by exploiting loopholes
whose expansion is fostered by regulatory competition.  The substantial capital positions
these banks have chosen to carry suggest that their firm-wide risk exposure has increased
proportionately.
In rebuilding its world standing, the U.S. banking sector has been helped by the
resolution of the U.S. deposit-insurance mess.  In the post-FDICIA regulatory
environment, better-disciplined U.S. regulatory enterprises have expanded their
jurisdiction at the expense of less-disciplined regulators such as those in Japan.  The
recent sharp decline in the stock-market capital of banks in other Pacific Rim countries
provides evidence of failures in credit allocation and regulatory discipline in these
countries as well.
The alleged desirability of “regulatory harmonization” is the watchword of
international regulatory agreements such as the Basle accord on risk-based capital and of
international regulatory associations such as the Bank for International Settlements and
the International Organization of Securities Commissioners.  However, harmonization is
not a panacea.  It can easily deteriorate into cartel-like arrangements that preserve across
countries and across types of financial institution dysfunctional rules for dividing turf and
supervising information flows and contract enforcement.
From the perspective of taxpayers, convergence to a single set of rules backed up
by turf-allocating supervisory protocols is an inappropriate goal.  If achieved, it would
lessen the disciplinary benefits that offshore regulatory competition can have on host-
country regulators.  A more apt harmonization metaphor can be rooted in the meaning
that harmony takes in esthetics.  In art, harmony refers to the effect of combining two or
more disparate elements into a pleasing aggregate that nevertheless preserves the
individual identity of the component elements.  The sound of a barbershop quartet33
illustrates the idea and clarifies the value of not trying to force every regulator either to
sing precisely the same tune or to adopt the same voice quality.
In the short run, regulatory differences induce capital movements that uncover
insolvencies among deposit institutions and complicate the task of measuring and
controlling individual countries’ money stock.  But the long-run global effect of
competitive reregulation is to generate more open and more robust financial systems.
Around the world, persistent defects exist in incentives for taxpayers and elected
politicians to demand the informational transparency they need to monitor and minimize
the long-run opportunity costs that jurisdiction-maximizing government agencies incur in
producing regulatory services.  Any protocol that enforces regulatory co-ordination
across nations must inevitably limit the scope in individual countries for further
information disclosure and competitive reregulation.  The process of negotiating such a
protocol is bound to introduce provisions designed to promote the personal and
bureaucratic interests of the individual-country regulators who meet to craft it (Wagster,
1996).  Regulators who derive personal and bureaucratic benefits from protecting their
regulatees’ market share will hold out for arrangements or stipulations --such as the
principle of national treatment-- that reduce the winnowing force of regulatory
competition (Selgin, 1996).
Globalization reduces differences in the net regulatory benefit or burden that
particular regulators offers their client FSFs.  As noted earlier, a client’s net benefit is the
net value of regulatory services received, after deducting explicit and implicit charges
that inhere in its regulator’s scheme of regulation.  The key point to see is that --ignoring
switching costs-- net, not gross burdens are what market forces equalize across countries
and sectors.  Gross benefits and burdens may reasonably differ as much as a country’s
regulatees and potentially apathetic taxpayers would be willing to tolerate.
In the past, market-segmenting elements in the country-specific character of
inherited patterns of financial regulation were protected by distance-related, culture-
related, currency-related and language-related costs that serve as barriers to entry for
foreign financial firms.  Technological change is dramatically reducing the significance
of these barriers by increasing opportunities for financial institutions to arbitrage
differences in net regulatory burdens across countries.34
Regulatory competition is imposing painful adjustments on previously self-
satisfied operators of regulatory enterprises.  In the end, these adjustments will produce
regulatory patterns that are less resistant to market entry and exit.  However, they will do
this faster, the more accountable the affected regulatory enterprises can be made to be for
the burdens they transfer to taxpayers.
Viewed from this perspective, the globalization of real and financial markets
emerges as a process in which increasing international competition acting through
country-specific regulatory crises imposes market discipline on government regulators.
A technology-driven and irreversible downward trend in the costs of switching regulators
and coordinating a multinational enterprise implies shrinking spheres of autonomy for
economic policymakers in different countries.  What is ultimately constricted is the
freedom of politicians and government regulatory bureaus both to use financial
institutions as a conduit for delivering political favors and to enforce rules of financial
competition designed to protect the market share of insolvent or high-cost local
institutions.
VIII. Policy Implications: The Importance of Improving Regulatory Incentives
Democratic governments around the world respond to political pressure to protect
domestic institutions from incursions by foreign competitors and to bail out important
domestic enterprises (including government-owned entities) when they become insolvent.
The predictability of this response leads bank creditors to infer the existence of implicit
taxpayer guarantees even in societies that eschew a formal system of deposit insurance or
operate without any other form of statutory safety net for financial firms.
What is missing in most countries is a timely mechanism for measuring and
limiting taxpayer guarantees and for collecting user fees from institutions that receive
conjectural guarantees.  Taxpayer costs cannot be minimized unless regular accounting
reports can be made informative enough that, day in and day out, market participants may
fairly test the cost and adequacy of government guarantee programs.  Informed
opportunities for fair testing are needed to make regulators accountable in timely fashion
for measuring, pricing, and funding all claims upon taxpayer resources.  Only if
authorities are regularly threatened by information-based checks on the quality of their35
performance will they have strong incentives to recapitalize explicit and implied
insurance funds promptly when fund revenues and reserves first become insufficient to
sustain their obligations.
Lags inherent in governmental information, monitoring, and regulatory-response
systems are lengthened by the self-interested bureaucratic suppression of information
concerning the changing market value of government guarantees.  Such information
needs to be published in transparent and timely fashion for the press and taxpayers to
monitor.  The bottom line is that what is not adequately measured will not be adequately
managed.
Mispricing governmental guarantees serves the covert goal of increasing a
particular regulator’s short-run market share.  But it simultaneously creates strong
incentives for its regulatees to search out new forms of risk taking and for foreign
financial firms and non-financial domestic institutions to devise inventive methods for
folding government-guaranteed financial subsidiaries or affiliates into their
organizational form.  These incentives lead to an unsustainable extension of the
mispriced guarantees and an eventual breakdown in the bureaucratic arrangements that
support them.
Because of regulatory lags, opportunities for shifting risk onto governmental
guarantors are especially great for innovative activities.  Market participants that believe
their own wealth to be on the line would inevitably demand that banks either disclose the
information needed to evaluate their risk exposures or pay an appropriate uncertainty
premium.  When this demand is anesthetized by credible government guarantees,
taxpayers need to insist that government regulators collect solid and timely information
on the risk implications of financial activities.
Increases in a firm’s market capitalization that result from mispriced and
misadministered government guarantees derive from increasing the risk that the firm may
fail.  By expanding the risk that individual institutions will become insolvent, defective
regulatory incentives can undermine not just the efficiency of risk control and
certification, but the short-run stability of the world’s financial system.
Offering hidden subsidies compromises a regulator’s duty to taxpayers.  This
incentive conflict is severe when bank creditors feel safe and officials remain imperfectly36
accountable for the effects of the subsidy scheme.  Recognizing incentive conflict
between social and private goals lets us see repetitive regulatory deficiencies as more
than a series of foolish and inexplicable mistakes.
The Regulatory Dialectic treats rolling financial crises as a form of
Schumpeterian creative destruction.  The globalization of banking and guarantee markets
intensifies competitive reregulation.  Reregulation expands opportunities for citizens to
protect themselves from the cost of unsustainable banking policies, making it less costly
for business corporations and wealthy investors to engage in silent runs on insolvent
“zombie” banks.  Silent runs by suspicious large-denomination depositors are halting the
loss-shifting processes inherent in insolvent guarantee systems faster today than in the
past.  Rolling banking and currency crises have become so frequent in recent years and
have concentrated in developing countries because advances in information and
communications technology have enabled better-guaranteed institutions to invade
previously segmented markets for banking services and even limited entry by foreign
institutions expands opportunities for domestic citizens to test arrangements for
supporting government guarantees.
The dialectical theory of information-based financial crises emphasizes that
individual-country financial crises are not disastrous events that should be avoided at all
cost.  Each crisis is a wake-up call that signals the breakdown of an unsustainably
contradictory policy mix.  Because authorities have an incentive to resolve crises in ways
that preserve defects in their accountability, one wake-up call is never enough.  In
providing funds to stabilize what they perceive to be a currency crisis, the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund can avoid neutralizing the pressure that the crisis puts
on a country’s authorities to abandon discredited policy strategies of information flow
and financial regulation by combining Bank and Fund assistance to any country with
enforceable procedures for assuring the collection and disclosure of more reliable
information about the future performance and condition of that country’s financial
institutions and regulatory system.37
TABLE 1:  TWO MODELS OF OFFSHORE REGULATORY COMPETITION
Offshore Environment Host-Country Environment
First Model
Financial Technology Sophisticated Sophisticated
Regulatory Strategy Few Restrictions on
Domestic-Bank Pursuit of
Scale and Scope Economies
Many Restrictions on
Domestic-Bank Pursuit of
Scale and Scope Economies
Second Model
Financial Technology Sophisticated Lagging
Regulatory Strategy Zombie Banks are Dealt
with Promptly
Zombie Banks are Sustained
by Coverup and Government
Guarantees
TABLE 2: THREE STRATEGIC ELEMENTS CHARACTERIZE THE BANKING
POLICIES OF ALMOST EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD TODAY:
1.  Politically-Directed Subsidies to Selected Bank Borrowers:  The policy framework
either requires or rewards banks for making credit available to designated classes
of borrowers at a subsidized interest rate;
2.  Subsidies to Bank Risk-Taking:  The policy framework commits government officials
to providing on subsidized terms explicit or conjectural guarantees to holders of
bank liabilities;
3.  Defective Monitoring and Control of the Subsidies:  The contracting and reporting
framework for government officials fails to make them directly accountable for
controlling the size of either subsidy.38
TABLE 3:  DIALECTICAL VIEW OF ECONOMIC CRISES
THESIS: Unsustainable Policy Mix
• Expansionary Monetary and Fiscal Policy vs. Relatively Fixed Exchange Rates
• Loss-Causing Credit-Allocation Schemes (“government-sabotaged loans”) vs.
Government Guarantees of Bank Liabilities
ANTITHESIS:  Market Discipline Tests Increasingly Expensive Government Promises to
Support the Unsustainable Exchange Rate or Banking System
• In Currency Crises, Test = Bear Raids
• In Banking Crises, Test = Silent Runs by Savvy Depositors
SYNTHESIS:  Crisis Occurs When Authorities Lose Their Nerve and Accept the Need to
Change Policy Mix.  The New Policy Mix Becomes a New Thesis and Is Shaped by
the Political Economy of Bailouts, Recapitalizations, and Blame.39
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